About me
I am an assistant professor at Higher School of Economics Moscow (HSE) since 2020. I studied math at Moscow State University (MSU), then economics at New Economic School (NES) and University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and most recently, data science and programming at Yandex School of Data Analysis (YSDA).
I work primarily in the field of non-standard auction design such as: procurement, double and scoring auctions; and adjacent topics of collusion and estimation. My dissertation Mechanism Choice in Scoring Auctions at UCLA brings attention to the trade-off between quality and cost in scoring auction - an important but understudied auction format for procurement, see also codes and data. In my spare time I dabble in machine learning and python.
My cv is here, my email is pandreyanov at gmail dot com.
I have several published papers
- Secret Reserve Prices by Uninformed Sellers, QE 2022, with El Hadi Caoui
- Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange, RESTUD 2021, with T. Sadzik
My R&Rs
- Optimal Robust Double Auctions, with T. Sadzik and J. Park, presented at EWMES 2022 (Berlin), EEA 2023 (Barcelona), EARIE 2024 (Amsterdam), reject-and-resubmit at AER 2024
Submitted or between submissions
- Past Performance and Procurement Outcomes, with F. Decarolis, R. Pacini and G. Spagnolo, presented at Oligo 2023 (Padova), EARIE 2023 (Rome)
- Nonparametric inference on counterfactuals in first-price auctions, with G. Franguridi, presented at EARIE 2022 (Vienna) and EEA 2022 (Milan), at EEA 2024 (Rotterdam)
My other projects
- Auctions after Actions, with A. Suzdaltsev and I. Krasikov
- Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design, with A. Suzdaltsev and I. Krasikov, presented at EARIE 2023 (Rome) by Alex
- Optimal Robust Public Goods, with B. Jeong and J. Copic
- Detecting Auctioneer Corruption, with A. Davidson, Uber and V. Korovkin, Cerge-EI
- 21-century Media Capture, with E. Abramov