I am an assistant professor at Higher School of Economics Moscow (HSE). I studied math at Moscow State University (MSU), then economics at New Economic School (NES) and University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and most recently, data science and programming at Yandex School of Data Analysis (YSDA).
I work primarily in the field of non-standard auction design such as: procurement, double and scoring auctions; and adjacent topics of collusion and estimation. My dissertation Mechanism Choice in Scoring Auctions at UCLA brings attention to the trade-off between quality and cost in scoring auction - an important but understudied auction format for procurement, see also codes and data. In my spare time I dabble in machine learning and python.
My cv is here, my email is pandreyanov at gmail dot com.
I have several published papers
- Secret Reserve Prices by Uninformed Sellers, QE 2022, with El Hadi Caoui
- Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange, RESTUD 2021, with T. Sadzik
I have several working papers
- Past Performance and Procurement Outcomes, with F. Decarolis, R. Pacini and G. Spagnolo
- Optimal Robust Double Auctions, with T. Sadzik and J. Park, presented at EWMES 2022 (Berlin)
- Nonparametric inference on counterfactuals in first-price auctions, with G. Franguridi, presented at EARIE 2022 (Vienna) and EEA-ESEM 2022 (Milan).
- Optimal Robust Public Goods, with B. Jeong and J. Copic
My other work in progress
- Scoring and Favoritism in Procurement, with A. Suzdaltsev and I. Krasikov
- Detecting Auctioneer Corruption, with A. Davidson, Uber and V. Korovkin, Cerge-EI
- 21-century Media Capture, with E. Abramov