About me

I studied math at Moscow State University (MSU), then economics at New Economic School (NES) and University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and most recently, data science and programming at Yandex School of Data Analysis (YSDA).

I work primarily in the field of non-standard auction design such as: procurement, double and scoring auctions; and adjacent topics of collusion and estimation. My dissertation Mechanism Choice in Scoring Auctions at UCLA brings attention to the trade-off between quality and cost in scoring auction - an important but understudied auction format for procurement, see also codes and data. In my spare time I dabble in machine learning and python.

#My cv is here, my email is pandreyanov at gmail dot com.

I have several published papers

My R&Rs

Submitted or between submissions

My other projects

  • More Quality Criteria, Fewer Bidders in Scoring Auctions, with Andrea Bafundi, Riccardo Camboni, Giancarlo Spagnolo Paola Valbonesi, presented at ASSET
  • Auctions after Actions, with A. Suzdaltsev and I. Krasikov, presented at EEA 2024 (Mallorka), EARIE 2025 (Valencia)
  • Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design, with A. Suzdaltsev and I. Krasikov, presented at EARIE 2023 (Rome) by Alex
  • Optimal Robust Public Goods, with B. Jeong and J. Copic
  • Detecting Auctioneer Corruption, with A. Davidson, Uber and V. Korovkin, Cerge-EI
  • 21-century Media Capture, with E. Abramov